Purpose -This paper aims to address the privacy problem associated with the use of internet search engines. The purpose of the paper is to propose and validate a set of methods and protocols to guarantee the privacy of users' queries. Design/methodology/approach -In this paper h(k)-private information retrieval (h(k)-PIR) is defined as a practical compromise between computational efficiency and privacy. Also presented are h(k)-PIR protocols that can be used to query any database, which does not even need to know that the user is trying to preserve his or her privacy. Findings -The proposed methods are able to properly protect the privacy of users' queries. When internet users apply the protocols, search engines (e.g. Google) are not able to determine unequivocally the real interests of their users. The quality of the results does decrease with the increase in privacy, but the obtained trade-off is excellent. Practical implications -Current private information retrieval (PIR) protocols suffer from two significant shortcomings: their computational complexity is O(n) where n is the number of records in the database, which precludes their use for very large databases and web search engines; and they assume that the database server cooperates in the PIR protocol, which prevents deployment in real-life uncooperative settings. The proposed protocols overcome both problems. Originality/value -This is the first set of protocols that offer practical protection for the privacy of the queries that internet users submit to an internet search engine. The proposal has been implemented and it will be released to the general public soon. It will help to protect the right to privacy of millions of internet users.
Introduction
Privacy in databases can be viewed as a three-dimensional property (Domingo-Ferrer, 2007) , because a distinction can be made between respondent privacy (privacy of the respondents to whom the database records correspond), owner privacy (privacy of proprietary datasets used to conduct joint research between several data-owning organisations) and user privacy (privacy of the queries submitted by database users). In the context of interactively queryable databases and in particular, internet search engines, the most rapidly growing concern is user privacy. This is especially so after scandals like the August 2006 disclosure by the AOL search engine of 20 million queries made by 658,000 users (AOL, 2006) . It is estimated that over 223 million data records of US residents have been exposed due to security breaches since January 2005 (Lane et al., 2008) , so an attacker could access user profiles stored in the databases of search engines.
There are personal and corporate motivations for requiring user privacy:
. Private life. Most users feel uncomfortable about being profiled by a search engine or a database.
. Industrial life. If a company is querying a database containing patents or stock market quotations, the database manager can partially infer the company's next technological or financial moves if he or she knows the queries being submitted by the company.
Private information retrieval (PIR) was invented in 1995 by Chor et al. (1995 Chor et al. ( , 1998 with the assumption that there are at least two copies of the same database, which do not communicate with each other. In those same papers, Chor et al. showed that single-database PIR (that is, with a single copy) does not exist in the information-theoretic sense. However, two years later, Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky (1997) presented a method for constructing single-database PIR based on the algebraic properties of the Goldwasser-Micali public-key encryption scheme (Goldwasser and Micali, 1984) . Subsequent developments in PIR are surveyed in Ostrovsky and Skeith (2007) . In the PIR literature the database is usually modelled as a vector. The user wishes to retrieve the value of the i-th component of the vector while keeping the index i hidden from the database. Thus it is assumed that the user knows the physical address of the sought item, which might be too strong an assumption in many practical situations. Keyword PIR (Chor et al., 1997; Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky, 1997 ) is a more flexible form of PIR -the user can submit a query consisting of a keyword and no modification of the structure of the database is needed.
We claim that the PIR protocols proposed so far have two fundamental shortcomings that hinder their practical deployment:
(1) The database is assumed to contain n items and PIR protocols attempt to guarantee maximum privacy, that is, maximum server uncertainty on the index i of the record retrieved by the user. Thus the computational complexity of such PIR protocols is O(n), as proven by Chor et al. (1995 Chor et al. ( , 1998 . Intuitively, all records in the database must be "touched"; otherwise, the server could rule out some of the records when trying to discover i (an implicit standard assumption in PIR is that no side information is available to the server allowing it to rule out a touched record). For large databases, an O(n) computational cost is unaffordable (Beimel et al., 2004) . (2) It is assumed that the database server cooperates in the PIR protocol. However, it is the user who is interested in his or her own privacy, whereas the motivation for the database server is dubious. Actually, PIR is likely to be unattractive to h(k)-private information retrieval most companies running queryable databases, as it limits their profiling ability. This probably explains why no real instances of PIR-enabled databases seem to exist.
If one wishes to run PIR against a search engine, there is another shortcoming beyond the lack of server cooperation -the database cannot be modelled as a vector in which the user can be assumed to know the physical location of the keyword sought. Even keyword PIR does not really fit, as it still assumes a mapping between individual keywords and physical addresses (in fact, each keyword is used as an alias of a physical address). A search engine allowing only searches of individual keywords stored in this way would be much more limited than real engines like Google or Yahoo. TrackMeNot (Howe and Nissenbaum, 2009 ) is a practical system based on the principle that a browser extension installed in the user's computer hides the user's actual queries in a cloud of automatic ghost queries submitted to popular search engines at different time intervals. While useful and affordable on a small scale, if the use of TrackMeNot became generalised, the overhead introduced by ghost queries would significantly degrade the performance of search engines and communications networks. Also, the submission timing of automatic ghost queries may be distinguishable from the submission timing of actual queries, which could provide an intruder with clues to identify the latter type of queries.
In this paper the notion of h(k)-PIR is introduced as a pragmatic approach to private information retrieval from real search engines. Given a user's query consisting of one or several target keywords, the basic idea is to achieve some level of privacy by adding k 2 1 bogus keywords to the user's actual target keywords. In this way, the database or search engine cannot determine with certainty which is (are) the user's target keyword(s). The higher the number k 2 1 of bogus keywords and the more similar the frequency of the target and the bogus keywords, the more privacy. Then a protocol is proposed that enables a user to perform h(k)-PIR against a web search engine or database server that is uncooperative in preserving the privacy of user queries. By "uncooperative", we mean that the engine or server does not offer any specific PIR functionality (this is usually the case in reality); however, we assume that the server is semi-honest, in the sense that the server may be interested in user profiling but will correctly answer any user query.
h(k)-Private information retrieval
Defining privacy in terms of maximum index uncertainty is impractical if the database consists of billions of web pages indexed by a search engine. Even if the stored web pages could be modelled as a vector with n records, n would be so large that the O(n) computational complexity of a PIR query would be unaffordable.
Privacy requirements must be relaxed. A possible relaxation is h(k)-PIR, whose idea is to ensure that the uncertainty of the database or search engine about which is the actual user target keyword is no less than a lower bound expressed in terms of a privacy parameter k. In what follows, Shannon's entropy[1] will be used to quantify this lower bound on query uncertainty, because it is the most common uncertainty measure.
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Definition 1: h(k)-private information retrieval Given a non-negative integer k and a function hð · Þ such that hðkÞ $ 0, a query protocol against a queryable database or a search engine provides h(k)-private information retrieval, or h(k)-PIR for short, for a user query q 0 if any intruder (including the database server or the search engine) views the user query as a random variable Q 0 , whose Shannon's entropy satisfies H ðQ 0 Þ $ hðkÞ.
In plain words, the above definition means that the query appears to the intruder as a variable Q 0 , which can take several possible values, so that the intruder cannot unequivocally determine which was the value q 0 actually submitted by the user.
Example 1. If in the intruder's view there are k queries that are equally likely candidates to be the target query q 0 submitted by the user, then H ðQ 0 Þ ¼ log 2 k and the protocol provides log 2 k-privacy (the highest possible privacy with k candidates). If the probabilities of the k candidates being q 0 are different, H ðQ 0 Þ , log 2 k and therefore h(k)-privacy with hðkÞ , log 2 k is achieved. If the protocol is such that the intruder knows for sure which of the k candidates is q 0 , then the protocol provides only 0-privacy, that is, no privacy at all. Obviously, for any non-negative k 0 and any function hð · Þ such that 0 #ĥðk 0 Þ # hðkÞ, a h(k)-private protocol is alsoĥðk 0 Þ-private. The computational complexity of protocols implementing h(k)-PIR can be as low as O(k), whatever the size of the database. The user can camouflage the target query within a set of k equally likely or almost equally likely queries (the target query plus k 2 1 bogus queries); then the user submits the set of queries and finally filters out the results relevant to the target query.
Note that the relaxation introduced by h(k)-PIR with respect to PIR is somewhat parallel to the one introduced by k-anonymity (Samarati and Sweeney, 1998 ) with respect to total anonymity.
Single-user h(k)-PIR from a privacy-uncooperative queryable database In this section we start with the assumption that queries consist of a single keywordthe query output is expected to consist of the database records or web URLs containing that keyword. (An extension for multi-keyword queries is given later in this paper.) A relatively simple way to approach h(k)-PIR has been suggested at the end of the previous section -k 2 1 bogus keywords are added to the target query before submitting it. Adding means OR-ing the target keyword with the bogus keywords. Some considerations are in order here:
(1) It will be assumed that keywords belong to some designated language (e.g. English and/or a domain-specific language). (2) A public reference thesaurus with a large number N of words and proper nouns in the designated language will be used to draw bogus keywords from. The thesaurus should provide the keywords along with their relative frequencies. There are several alternatives to obtain such a thesaurus:
. Query logs are possibly the best option to build the thesaurus. Keyword frequencies are taken based on the keyword appearances in the log. A good example of a query log is the above-mentioned search data released by AOL For queries in English, one can also follow the procedure suggested by Staddon et al. (2007) : use the British National Corpus (BNC) (Leech et al., 2001) to stem lexical keywords (e.g. the keywords "use", "used", "uses" and "using" would all be mapped to the stem "use"); use the BNC again to associate to each keyword the frequency of the corresponding stem. (3) OR-ing bogus queries to the target query results in some overhead, because the output returned by the search engine needs to be filtered out to suppress the portion related to the bogus queries. (4) For privacy reasons, bogus query addition and output filtering must be done locally at the user's computer.
As a first approach, a standalone user can run the following algorithm.
Protocol 1 (Naïve(q 0 ; k)) (1) N: To mask the real target keyword q 0 , locally sample the thesaurus to randomly draw k 2 1 bogus keywords q 1 ; q 2 ; L; q k21 . (2) Submit the query: q pð0Þ OR qpð1Þ ORL qpðk21Þ where p is a random permutation of the set 0; 1; L; k 2 1 f g . (3) Once the query results are received, keep those results where the keyword q 0 appears and discard the rest.
Note that the random permutation p in Protocol 1 is needed to hide the place of q 0 in the submitted query. After masking q 0 with the bogus keywords q 1 ; q 2 ; L; q k21 , the database, search engine or, more generally, any intruder observing the masked query is uncertain about which one among the k keywords is the real target keyword q 0 . In fact, one can say that an intruder views the target keyword as a random variable Q 0 with possible outcomes q 0 ; q 1 ; L; q k21 . The intruder's uncertainty about the actual value of the target keyword can be measured as the entropy of Q 0 -the more similar the frequencies of the q i 's, the higher the entropy, which makes sense because the intruder's uncertainty is higher (which is good). This is formalised by the following lemma. Lemma 1. Let q 0 be the target keyword a user is interested in, and let f ðq 0 Þ be its relative frequency in the reference thesaurus. Let q 1 ; L; q k21 be k 2 1 bogus keywords with relative frequencies f ðq 1 Þ; L f ðq k21 Þ, respectively, used to construct the privacy-protected query of Expression (1). Assuming that the relative frequencies in the reference thesaurus represent well the relative frequencies of keywords in the natural or domain-specific language used in the database queries, the privacy of the target query can be measured as the entropy: OIR 33,4
where Q 0 is a random variable representing the intruder's view of the target keyword and:
Assume that an intruder tries to find the target keyword that is masked in the privacy-preserving submitted query of Expression (1). The intruder views this target keyword as a random variable Q 0 with k possible values
Therefore, the uncertainty about the specific outcome of Q 0 , that is, the privacy of q 0 , coincides with the entropy of Q 0 , that is:
Protocol 1 has at least two shortcomings: It does not guarantee any lower bound for the privacy H Q 0 ð Þ, which in the worst case could be as low as 0. Therefore, a priori the protocol can only guarantee trivial 0-PIR (of course, after a particular set of bogus keywords have been chosen, the actual privacy offered is H Q 0 ð Þ). If the same keyword q 0 is queried several times, it will be masked with different random bogus keywords each time, which will make it easy for an intruder to re-identify q 0 . In a large thesaurus with n keywords, the probability of a keyword belonging to two different random samples of k keywords is negligible (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix), so a repeated keyword is most likely the target keyword q 0 .
The user can circumvent the above shortcomings by running the following modified protocol.
Protocol 2 (Enhanced(q 0 upwd; k; 1))
(1) Let PRNG be a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator. Seed PRNG with the hash of the concatenation of the target keyword q 0 and a user password upwd. (2) Let the keywords in the thesaurus be ranked by increasing relative frequency. (3) Let f q 0 ð Þ be the relative frequency of the target keyword q 0 . (4) Adjust PRNG to uniformly generate real numbers in the interval max 0;
(6) If a þ 1 . 1 or there are less than k keywords in the thesaurus with relative frequencies in the interval a; a þ 1 Â Ã , then signal failure and exit the protocol.
h(k)-private information retrieval (7) Let M 1 $ k be the number of keywords in the thesaurus with relative frequencies in a; a þ 1 Â Ã . Let M 2 be the rank in the ranked thesaurus of the least frequent of the M 1 keywords. Adjust PRNG to generate pseudo-random numbers uniformly in the interval M 2 ; M 2 þ M 1 2 1 Â Ã (i.e. the interval containing the ranks of the M 1 keywords). (8) To mask the target keyword q 0 , call the PRNG generator K 2 1 times to draw K 2 1 bogus keywords q 1 ; q 2 ; L; q k21 by (pseudo-)randomly sampling without replacement from those keywords in the thesaurus with relative frequencies in a; a þ 1 Â Ã . (9) Submit the query
where p is a random permutation of the set 0; 1; L; k 2 1 f g . (10) Once the query results are received, keep those results where the keyword q 0 appears and discard the rest.
The complexity of Protocol 2 is clearly linear in k: each bogus keyword must be generated (Step 8) and the results related to the target keyword must be filtered out of the overall results for the k submitted keywords (Step 10). Some explanations of the rationale of the Protocol follow:
.
For a certain user with a user password upwd and a specific target keyword q 0 the bogus keywords are always the same in successive queries. This prevents an intruder from finding q 0 as the only repeated keyword in successive queries by the same user.
. The user password upwd is used to customise the bogus keywords generated for a given target keyword q 0 . This has a privacy-preserving effect. Indeed, if the bogus keywords only depended on the target keyword, a user u 1 who saw a query submitted by another user u 2 whose k keywords are identical to those in a past query of his or her own would know that the target keyword in u 2 's query is the same as in his or her own past query.
. Protocol 2 finds k 2 1 bogus keywords whose relative frequencies are similar to the relative frequency of q 0 . This guarantees the lower bound for the privacy H ðQ 0 Þ stated in Theorem 1 below.
Frequencies for the bogus items are taken in an interval
Using an interval centred in f q 0 ð Þ would be more intuitive, but certainly weaker -an intruder attempting to re-identify q 0 from the protected query could estimate q 0 as the median keyword among those in Expression (3).
The following theorem proves that nontrivial h(k)-privacy is guaranteed a priori by Protocol 2. For a certain target keyword q 0 to be protected, the lower privacy bound h(k) can guide the data protector in choosing 1 and the number k 2 1 of bogus keywords in order to achieve a certain privacy level.
OIR 33,4
Theorem 1 Let q 0 be the target keyword protected using Protocol 2 to generate the privacy-protected query in Expression (3). Then the privacy H Q 0 ð Þ of q 0 can be lower-bounded as:
where:
with:
and d is the greatest integer such that k 2 d ð ÞA þ dB # 1. Proof. Lemma 1 above can be used to write:
Using Jensen's inequality on the right-hand side of Equation (4), we get:
The lower bound in Equation (5) is minimum when:
h(k)-private information retrieval and:
On the other hand:
So Lemma 3 (see Appendix) can be used to find that the maximum of Expression (6) 
The corresponding maximum value of Expression (6) is:
The value of Expression (7) varies depending on A and B. Actually, it is maximum when A is as small as possible and B is as large as possible, which for fixed 1 and k happens when a is minimum, that is, for a min ¼ max 0; f q 0 ð Þ 2 1 À Á .
An extension for multi-keyword queries Protocol 2 can easily be extended to handle multi-keyword queries by making the following adaptations:
Replace the target keyword q 0 with a Boolean expression E 0 involving several keywords.
. Replace f q 0 ð Þ with the relative frequency f E 0 ð Þ of E 0 , computed using the standard algebra employed to find the probability of a Boolean expression of events; in particular, if keywords can be assumed to be independent and E 0 is the logical AND of several keywords, f E 0 ð Þ can be computed as the product of the relative frequencies of the keywords.
. Instead of bogus keywords q 1 ; q 2 ; L; q k21 , use bogus expressions E 1 ; E 2 L; E k21 whose relative frequency lies in the interval a; a þ 1 Â Ã .
Submit the query:
Once the query results are received, keep those results where E 0 appears and discard the rest.
The GooPIR prototype and empirical results A prototype called GooPIR has been developed in Java JDK 6.0 Standard Edition to implement the scheme described in Protocol 2. The prototype accepts queries consisting of single keywords or queries consisting of a logical AND of several keywords (with the limitation that independence between the keywords must be a OIR 33,4 plausible assumption). GooPIR locally masks the target keyword(s), submits the masked query to the Google search engine and then locally filters the results relevant to the target keyword(s). A screenshot of the prototype can be seen in Figure 1 . The figure presents the search results for the keyword "University". By clicking on the "Details" button, the following information about the execution of Protocol 2 is displayed:
. The target query q 0 ¼ "University" and its relative frequency f q 0 ð Þ ¼ 0:00648 in the reference thesaurus (see below for details of how the thesaurus was obtained); The number M 1 ¼ 34 of candidate bogus keywords with frequencies within the search interval;
The list of k 2 1 ¼ 10 bogus keywords used for masking, as well as their frequencies;
The entropy of the masked entry, that is, H Q 0 ð Þ ¼ 3:4582 bits (for the parameters used, the a priori lower bound of the entropy guaranteed by Theorem 1 is 3.42412 bits). . GooPIR assigned to each word in the thesaurus its relative frequency of appearance in the news articles described above. The resulting n ¼ 9096 EMBED English words with non-zero frequency were taken as the reference thesaurus with frequencies. Table I reports additional empirical results for keywords in several frequency ranges and for several values of 1 and k. For each choice of frequency, 1 and k, the following information is given: search interval a; a þ 1 Â Ã , number M 1 of candidate bogus keywords with frequencies in the search interval, entropy of the masked query and a priori lower bound for the entropy according to Theorem 1. Note that one gets a trivial a priori lower bound equal to zero whenever f q 0 ð Þ # 1 (in this case a min ¼ 0 and the lower bound is zero too). For conciseness, the bogus keywords used for masking have been omitted; however, their sequence is always the same for a certain target keyword in successive queries (regardless of k). For example, for q 0 ¼"theater" with the parameters in the table, we get q 1 ¼ "vocally" (with frequency f q 1 ð Þ ¼ 0:0001), q 2 ¼ "murderers" (with frequency f q 2 ð Þ ¼ 0:0001), q 3 ¼"dollar" (with frequency f q 3 ð Þ ¼ 0:00098), q 4 ¼"biodiversity" (with frequency f q 4 ð Þ ¼ 0:00043), etc.
Quality assessment of the results
Offering privacy to users by hiding the target keyword among other bogus keywords would not be attractive if the toll for privacy preservation was a substantial alteration of the query results. In order to assess quality, we have compared the query results obtained with and without our method. The following notation is used in this section:
The set of URLs obtained with Google.
U:
The set of URLs obtained with GooPIR.
The cardinality of U andÛ (the first N URL URLs for both outputs are considered).
We propose three simple quality measures. The first measure is the percentage of coincidences between U andÛ, that is:
where Card · ð Þ is used to denote set cardinality. 
The second measure is the average distance between coincidences, that is:
where r U u ð Þ is the rank of u within U and rÛ u ð Þ is the rank of u withinÛ. The third measure is the variance of the rank differences between the results, which are both in U andÛ, that is:
Card U >Û
The outcome of the above measures varies depending on the relative frequency of the searched keyword. To study the influence of the frequency on the quality of the results, we have defined the following cases:
Low-frequency keywords, whose frequency lies in the first quartile.
. Medium-frequency keywords, whose frequency lies in the second or third quartiles.
. High-frequency keywords, whose frequency lies in the fourth quartile.
The following algorithm has been used to assess the quality of our results for different keyword frequencies (the number of queries was NQ ¼ 10 and the number of query results was N URL ¼ 25). Table IV . Quality analysis for some high-frequency keywords h(k)-private information retrieval the quality of the results decreases when the number K 2 1 of bogus keywords increases (see Figure 2) . However, the average of QM 1 (percentage of coincidences) is higher than 40 per cent even when the number of bogus keywords is high (e.g. K ¼10 keywords). In addition, the average of QM 2 (rank distance) is always lower than QM 3 . As could be expected, the average of QM 3 (rank variance) tends to grow with k. It is apparent from Figure 2 that the lower the frequency the better the quality. The above measures show that, overall, the search results obtained with GooPIR are quite good. We next focus our analysis on the search results most relevant to the user, namely those results which appear first, that is, with lowest ranks. We have defined blocks of five results each:
( Tables V-X show some blockwise quality measurements of the GooPIR results for low, medium and high frequencies, respectively. We have observed that the average of QM 1 (average percentage of coincidences) in the first block is very high (i.e. between 65 per cent and 86 per cent) and the quality of the results tends to decrease in blocks with higher ranks. In addition, the influence of the frequency seems to be the same as in the non-blockwise analysis -better quality is obtained for lower frequencies.
Conclusions and future work
In this paper the concept of hðkÞ-private information retrieval or hðkÞ-PIR has been introduced as a pragmatic approach to offer users some query privacy in real databases and search engines. Then two protocols for keywords (a naïve one and an enhanced one) have been presented that do not assume any cooperation from the database in protecting the privacy of user queries; the second one offers nontrivial hðkÞ-PIR and can be extended to handle multi-keyword queries. The proposed protocols rely on a public thesaurus of keywords labelled with their relative frequencies. We have also presented empirical results obtained with a prototype implementing the enhanced protocol to provide keyword hðkÞ-PIR when querying internet search engines. However simple, the presented approach to obtain some user privacy when querying a privacy-uncooperative database server or search engine seems to be new in the literature.
Future work may include:
Adding semantic diversity requirements to the frequency requirements when choosing the bogus keywords used to mask a given target keyword. A possible measure of semantic diversity is the hierarchical nominal variance defined in .
. Pre-processing the thesaurus to create clusters of keywords with similar frequency, so that selecting the bogus keywords is faster. Given a target keyword, a entire cluster of thesaurus keywords is taken as bogus keywords. Clusters must consist of k 2 1 (or more) keywords, and can be computed by using microaggregation . Note 1. Given a discrete random variable X and probability function p, the entropy H ðXÞ of X is defined as H ðXÞ ¼ 2 P n i¼1 pðx i Þlog 2 pðx i Þ, where x 1 ; · · ·; x n are the outcomes of X having non-zero probability (see Shannon, 1948 ). Shannon's entropy measures the uncertainty about the specific outcome that will be obtained when the random variable X is sampled.
